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ENVIRONMENT: GARRISON DAM, COLUMBIA RIVER, THE
IJC, NGOS
Nigel Bankes t
Canadian Speaker
Thanks for that introduction, Brad, and thanks for the invitation to be here
to speak today.
I want to commence my remarks by relating a conversation I had with the
Immigration Officer yesterday at Calgary International Airport, who seemed
to be unusually interested in why I was heading down to the U.S.
I told him I was going to speak on the Columbia River Treaty. He ex-
pressed tremendous surprise there was, in fact, a Treaty relating to the Co-
lumbia River. Then the real kicker question was "what does it allow you (i.e.
Canada) to do to us (i.e. the United States)?" I thought that was an interest-
ing encapsulation, particularly if you are familiar with some of the terms of
the Columbia River Treaty and its co-operative and coordinated approach to
the development of the waters of the Basin.
I want to start with some preliminary observations that will help set the
scene for considering the idea of multiple actors within the Basin I will then
talk about the Columbia River Treaty itself.' I will focus on what the issues
have been since 1964. My argument is, while we may know the terms of the
Treaty, we must analyze what has happened since it entered into force. What
have been some of the issues that the parties have had to address?
t Nigel Bankes is a Professor of Law at the University of Calgary where he teaches or has
taught courses in property law, aboriginal law, natural resources law, energy law, oil and gas
law and international environmental law. He is a graduate of the universities of Cambridge
and British Columbia. Prior to joining the Faculty of Law in Calgary in 1984, he was a re-
search associate at the Canadian Institute of Resources Law. He was Professor in Residence at
the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in Ottawa from 1999-2000. He is
co-editor of Canadian Oil and Gas and a contributing editor to the Mineral Law Newsletter of
the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation. He has written a number of articles on the
Columbia River Treaty and is a member of the Water Initiatives Advisory Committee of the
Columbia Basin Trust.
1 See Nigel Bankes, The Columbia Basin and the Columbia River Treaty: Canadian Per-
spectives in the 1990s, NORTHWEST WATER LAW AND POLICY PROJECT RESEARCH PUBLICATION
P095-4 (1996).
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SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
First, while the Columbia River Treaty was and is very much a state-to-
state agreement governed by rules of public international law, it was also
clear when it was negotiated there would have been no Columbia River
Treaty without the active support of the government of the Province of Brit-
ish Columbia
Second, while in the context of the times the public review and ratifica-
tion process (involving hearings conducted by the Water Comptroller in Brit-
ish Columbia and parliamentary committee hearings in Ottawa) was actually
quite extensive there was little opportunity for participation by non-state ac-
tors. Indeed the public was seen as "people in the way" as the title of a book2
by Professor Wilson puts it in a text that looks at those who were to be dis-
placed as a result of the construction of the dams associated with the Treaty.
Third, while the focus of the Treaty in 1964, was very much power and
flood control,3 times have changed and different values have assumed in-
creased importance within the Basin. These values include fish values and
values associated with recreation and aesthetic concerns. While the debate
on the original values of power and flood control was dominated by an ex-
clusive club that was knowledgeable about these issues including the Bonne-
ville Power Administration, British Columbia Hydro as well as private utili-
ties, a plurality of different actors has emerged as the scope of the debate has
broadened. These new values are championed by a range of actors including
fisheries managers in both the United States and Canada, Environmental
Non-governmental Organizations (ENGOs), regional authorities, and some
newly constituted regional authorities like the Columbia Basin Trust in Can-
ada and the longer standing Northwest Power and Conservation Council in
the United States, as well as the tribes, and First Nations. These actors have
used a variety of strategies and opportunities to articulate their concerns and
bring them to the table. Often those strategies have involved the use of do-
mestic law, the Fisheries Act in Canada,4 and even more dramatically, the
Endangered Species Act in the United States,5 but the strategies also include
international institutions such as the CEC, as we heard earlier.
I disagree with Professor Schaffer to some extent (insofar as he suggests
that petitions are launched by persons within the state against whom the peti-
2 JAMES WOOD WILSON, PEOPLE IN THE WAY: THE HUMAN ASPECTS OF THE COLUMBIA
RIVER PROJECT (University of Toronto Press 1973).
3 See Columbia River Basin: Cooperative Development of Water Resources, Sept. 16,
1964, U.S.-Can., 15 U.S.T. 1555 (hereinafter Columbia River Treaty).
4 Fisheries Act, ch. LX, 1868 S.C. (31 Vict.) 177 (Can.) (hereinafter 1868 Act). See also
Fisheries Act, R.S. ch. F-14 (1985) (Can.) (hereinafter 1985 Act).
5 Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq.
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tion is launched) because one of the factual records that we have seen so far
was a factual record about Canada's alleged non-enforcement of Section 35-
1 of the Fisheries Act.6 That petition was presented by both U.S. and Cana-
dian NGOs.7
Fourth, while we have seen a range of new actors take the stage, one set
of actors has remained dominant in the basin. This set of actors comprises
the so-called "entities". These entities are the operating entities designated
by the two national governments under the terms of Article XIV(1) of the
Columbia River Treaty, B.C. Hydro, the Bonneville Power Administration
and the Army Corps of Engineers.8
Fifth, my own assessment, and I think the assessment of most commenta-
tors, is that the basic story of the Columbia River Treaty is a success both in
terms of its negotiation and its implementation. It is a success story precisely
because those who have been engaged in treaty negotiation and implementa-
tion have been asking somewhat different questions than those put to me by
the United States Immigration Officer yesterday. Their focus has always
been to try to identify the cooperative win-win solutions.
Here is a map of the basin. Note that while only 15 percent of the basin is
within Canada, 30 percent of the flows originate in Canada. The main stem
of the Columbia rises in Columbia Lake. As we move downstream, the map
identifies the key mainstem dams including Mica, Revelstoke and Keenley-
side South of the border is the massive Grand Coulee Dam constructed in the
1940s as well as string of dams below that site.
6 Chris Tollefson, Games Without Frontiers: Investor Claims and Citizen Submissions
Under the NAFTA Regime, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 141, 169 (2002).
7 Id.
8 Columbia River Treaty, Jan. 17, 1961, art. 14(1), United States-Canada, 15 U.S.T. 1555.
T.I.A.S. No. 5638.
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Figure 1. Columbia River Basin
Of AJ
Source: U.S. Army Corp of Engineers, Northwest Division, Fish Management Office, avail-
able at: http://www.nwd.usace.army.mil/ps/colrvbsn.htm.
One of the most notable consequences of Grand Coulee is that that dam
cut off the escapement of salmon to the entire upper Columbia Basin.9 Prior
to the dam, salmon used this entire basin all the way up to Windermere and
Columbia Lakes at the source of the Columbia. As a result, the only salmon
in the Canadian portion of the basin are in the Okanagan system where there
is a small population of sockeye.
The other main tributary with which we are concerned is the Kootenay.
The Kootenay rises in the Canadian Rockies, heads south to Libby Dam,
before heading north back up to Canada and into Kootenay Lake, before
joining the main stem of the Columbia 29 miles north of the boundary. Be-
low Kootenay Lake, there are a number of important Canadian dams includ-
ing Corra Linn and Brilliant.
9 Michael C. Blumm & Brett M. Swift The Indian Treaty Piscary Profit and Habitat
Protection in the Pacific Northwest: A Property Rights Approach, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 407,
472 (1998).
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WHAT ABOUT THE TREATY? WHAT DID THE TREATY HAVE TO
SAY?
Canada's commitments under the Treaty were to build three Treaty
dams, the Mica Dam, the Duncan Dam, and the Arrow Dam, (now known as
Keenleyside Dam) and to operate them in accordance with an assured operat-
ing plan and a set of detailed operating plans. These plans were designed to
provide flood control benefits and power benefits in both the United States
and Canada by providing storage that could be used to store flood waters and
firm-up existing and future generating capacity at downstream dams.
Canada also committed to provide flooding rights for Libby since Libby,
you will note from the map, backs up water into Canada (Lake Koocanusa)1°
Canada's other commitment was not to divert the Kootenay into the Colum-
bia, at least for a period of some years." You should note that Libby pro-
vides significant storage which can also be used for flood control and to firm
up capacity at downstream dams including the Canadian dams downstream
of Kootenay Lake some of which installed additional capacity following the
Columbia Treaty to take advantage of Libby. Those were the Canadian com-
mitments.
WHAT ABOUT THE CANADIAN ENTITLEMENTS UNDER THE
COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY?
The Canadian entitlements under the Treaty were 50 percent of the in-
cremental energy and capacity benefits from U.S. main stem dams.1 2 The
idea here is that Canadian storage in the upper Columbia firmed up capacity
at existing U.S. dams and that Canada, in return for providing storage, should
receive a share of these downstream power benefits. Those downstream
benefits, Canada (British Columbia) then immediately turned around and
sold into the United States on a presale basis for a 30-year period thereby
allowing British Columbia to raise the capital to simultaneously develop both
the Columbia and Peace systems. 13 In addition, Canada obtained upfront
flood control payments for the flood control benefits conferred on down-
stream U.S. Canada, as we have seen, was also able to capture downstream
benefits from Libby on the Kootenay dams downstream of Kootenay Lake.
There were also some non-treaty benefits, which became possible to Can-
ada. Canada built Mica, a Treaty dam, in such a way as to provide not just
10 Columbia River Treaty, Jan. 17, 1961, art. 12, United States-Canada, 15 U.S.T. 1555,
T.I.A.S. No. 5638.
" Id. at art. 13.
12 Id. at art. 4.
13 Daniel W. Meek, Pacific Northwest Conservation for California: The Mutual Benefits of
Long-Term Cooperation, 13 ENvTL. L. 841,894 (1983).
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the Treaty guaranteed storage, but also additional storage. Canada\British
Columbia also installed generation at Mica and built and installed generation
at Revelstoke, downstream of Mica.
WHAT WERE THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES?
Moving to the U.S. side of the equation, we see the correlatives of the
Canadian rights and obligations. Thus, the U.S. is obliged to provide down-
stream benefits and flood control payments, 4 and it is obliged to consult over
the operation of Libby.'5
The entitlements of the U.S. are, of course, to have significant effective
control, over the operation of Canadian Treaty dams in accordance with the
terms of assured operating plans as varied only by agreed detailed operating
plans. The U.S. was also allowed, but not obliged, to construct Libby. In
addition, Canada provided the flowage space for Libby.
Other actors in the United States who were involved in the Treaty frame-
work included those U.S. utilities on the main stem of the Columbia, who
were to be beneficiaries of the storage provided upstream. They were also
the parties who assumed responsibility for buying Canada's share of the
downstream benefits for the first 30 years.
WHAT ABOUT THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE TREATY?
I think the key institutions that the Treaty recognizes and creates are the
operating entities, British Columbia Hydro, Bonneville Power Administra-
tion, and the Army Corps of Engineers. 6 The Treaty delegates these entities
significant authority. These authorities include the opportunity to develop
win-win solutions by operating treaty and non-treaty facilities in ways that
will provide additional benefits to both countries.
As this is an integrated hydro system, and an interconnected electrical
system, the cooperation is a day-by-day, week-by-week affair facilitated
through an operating committee. Oversight of the entities is provided not by
the International Joint Commission, but by a body known as the Permanent
Engineering Board.' 7 Sometimes there is a lot in a name and this is certainly
true of the Permanent Engineering Board, which sees its primary task as be-
ing to ensure that the objectives of the Treaty are being met.18 What are
14 Columbia River Treaty, Jan. 17, 1961, art. 12(1), United States-Canada, 15 U.S.T. 1555,
T.I.A.S. No. 5638.
"5 Id. at art. 12(5).
16 Id. at annex.
17 Id. at art. 15.
18 Id., at art. 15, cl. 2(d).
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those objectives? The answer is the delivery of power and flood control val-
ues.
19
FOUR SIGNIFICANT ISSUES
What have been some of the most significant issues that the parties and
perhaps more specifically the entities have faced since 1964? 1 shall refer
briefly to four issues: (1) filling Mica, (2) fisheries issues, (3) the return of
the downstream entitlement, and (4) the operation of Libby for sturgeon
flows. I am going to spend most of the time talking about that fourth issue,
the operation of Libby for sturgeon flows.
One of the first issues that arose was how to fill Mica. This was an issue
because Mica, in addition to holding significant Treaty storage of seven mil-
lion acre feet (hereafter "MAF"), 20 also has some non-treaty storage of about
five MAF.2 1 Well, if Canada was going to fill that non-treaty storage, was it
not going to have a detrimental effect down in the United States? If so, how
should that be resolved? Furthermore, what would be the rules on the re-fill
of that non-treaty storage and the apportionment of benefits arising from the
use of that non-treaty storage?
In the end, the issue was resolved not by an amendment to the Treaty, but
by an agreement between the entities themselves, leading to something called
the non-treaty storage agreements.2 There are various iterations of those
agreements (hereafter, "NTSAs") still in force today.
I emphasize this point for two reasons. First, it shows the entities en-
gaged in problem solving. While they may do so under the general supervi-
sion of the Departments of State and Foreign Affairs in practice they have a
lot of latitude in finding practical on-the-ground solutions that make opera-
tional sense. Second, the existence of the NTSAs has provided significant
operational flexibility, which might not have been available in the Treaty, to
operate storage for different purposes other than power and flood control.
That takes me to the second issue. Fisheries issues started to emerge as
significant issues, particularly on the downstream portion of the Columbia
during the 1970s and 1980s. The other major tributary of the Columbia is of
course the Snake. While Grand Coulee had wiped out upper Columbia es-
capement, the U.S. became increasingly interested in finding flows of water
19 Id., at pmnbl.
20 Id., at art. II, cl. 2(a).
21 Michael C. Blumm & Andy Sinrin, The Unraveling of the Parity Promise: Hydro-
power, Salmon, and Endangered Species in the Columbia Basin, 21 ENVTL. L. 657, 709
(1991).
22 id.
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to support passage of Snake salmon down to the ocean by securing minimum
flows of water from facilities in the Upper Columbia
One of the questions was, "Could the United States require Canada to op-
erate Treaty storage for the purposes of providing those fish flows?" No,
answered the Permanent Engineering Board. However, while the Treaty
might not impose such an obligation the entities have been able to work out
annual arrangements to provide for fish flows in both Canada, below
Keenleyside (for resident fish), and in the United States. They were able to
do so in part because of the availability of non-treaty storage in Mica
Third, there was the question of the so-called return of the downstream
entitlement. You will recall that when the treaty was first implemented the
government of British Columbia elected to pre-sell its downstream entitle-
ment to US utilities.23 The terms of the sale involved thirty-year terms for
the share of the entitlement attributable to each of the three treaty dams and
commencing with the in-service date of each dam. Those sales arrangements
therefore expired over a five-year period between 1998 and 2003. The
Treaty of course did not expire (and will not expire until 2024 at the earli-
est)24 and so the return of the entitlement gave rise to a series of questions.
For example, if British Columbia were to take delivery of the power where
should it be delivered? Article V of the treaty contemplated delivery at
Oliver but given the pre-sale this had never happened and capacity at Oliver
was inadequate. Or, should the Canadian entity be allowed to take delivery
in the United States and re-sell into the US market and if so how should the
parties deal with place of delivery and transmission access.25 Ultimately, and
after an initial proposed deal collapsed, the parties were able to finalize an
agreement. Once again, it is important to emphasize that the entities took the
lead in working out the agreement although the two federal governments did
have to endorse the result since the treaty contemplated that delivery ar-
rangements should be approved by an exchange of notes.
Finally, I want to discuss the operation of Libby for sturgeon flows. It is
a nice example of the tension between a Treaty negotiated in a particular era
and informed by a particular set of values and a newer and emerging set of
values.26 So what is the issue?
With the completion of Libby in 1975, the Kootenay River was regulated
for power and flood control purposes. This had unforeseen consequences for
23 JC Day, Kristan Boudreau, Nancy C Hackett, Emerging institutions for bilateral man-
agement of the Columbia River Basin, AM. REv. OF CAN. STUD. (June 1997).
24 Columbia River Treaty, Jan. 17, 1961, art. 19, United States-Canada, 15 U.S.T. 1555,
T.I.A.S. No. 5638.
25 Id. at art. 15
26 For another example see the decision of the International Court of Justice in Case Concern-
ing the Gabcikovo and Nagymoros Project (Humgary Slovakia), [997] ICJ Rep. esp at para.
140.
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a population of sturgeon that was resident in the river between Libby and
Kootenay Lake.2 7 Essentially, and after a number of years, biologists discov-
ered that there was no recruitment of young sturgeon to that population once
the natural flow of the river had been changed. To cut a long story short, the
Kootenay sturgeon was listed under the Endangered Species Act 28 and the
Army Corps of Engineers, the operator of the dam became charged with the
obligation to operate Libby not for power and flood control purposes exclu-
sively, but to provide fish flows, flows for sturgeon, and, to a lesser extent,
for salmon.29
In the opinion of B.C. Hydro, this new operation of Libby caused power
losses at those Canadian dams located downstream of Kootenay Lake.30 B.C.
Hydro suggested that was a breach of the Treaty.31 The dispute escalated. It
came very close to being submitted to the International Joint Commission for
arbitration under Article XVI of the Columbia River Treaty. Ultimately,
however, the entities preferred to negotiate another win-win solution.
The basis of the agreement was that B.C. Hydro obtained additional flexi-
bility in the operation of Keenleyside,32 and the Army Corps of Engineers got
to operate Libby in accordance with the Endangered Species Act.3 3 Thus,
once again we have an entity driven solution endorsed by governments.
There are some real advantages with allowing the entities to develop the
solutions to identified problems. In particular, the entities have the knowl-
edge base and the operational capacity to imagine what might be possible
and where it might be possible to identify mutually advantageous solutions
that effectively make the pie bigger. By contrast, the federal governments
and especially the Departments of State and Foreign Affairs lack the working
knowledge of the operation of the hydro system and the interconnected
transmission system. However, there is also a potential downside from a
public policy perspective and it is this: "can we trust the entities?" Who are
these entities? They are power corporations. They are interested in and
27 Dwane Wilkin, Sturgeon's Sex Drive Disrupted by Hydro-Electric Dams, Researchers
Say, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS, April 16, 2001.28 First fish released in unique sturgeon stocking program, M2 PRESswIRE, Oct. 18, 2002.
29 Groups to Sue Army Corps Over Endangered Sturgeon, ENVIRONMENTAL NEWS
SERVICE, May 8, 2002.
30 Fish operations cause the dam to be operated more along the lines of the natural hydro-
graph. Consequently the operation mimics the spring freshet causing downstream dams to
spill water while later in the season there is less storage available to firm up capacity at those
downstream dams.
31 Specifically the obligation to consult under Article 12(5) and a more general obligation
to coordinate the operation of Libby.
32 Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of
Canada Concerning Pacific Salmon, Jan. 28, 1985, U.S-Can., 4, T.I.A.S. No. 11,091 (entered
into force Mar. 18, 1985).
33 Id.
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committed to the values of the Treaty, power and flood control. They are not
the natural guardians of the Columbia ecosystem in general or fish values in
particular. But can they be coerced into protecting those other values? And
this next question, leads us to think about other actors who may be in a posi-
tion to coerce the entities.
WHO ARE THESE OTHER ACTORS?
In addition to the Department of State and the Department of Foreign Af-
fairs, and the provincial government in British Columbia other key actors
include the fisheries managers in the two jurisdictions. For example, the
Department of Fisheries and Oceans in Canada has been taking an increas-
ingly active interest in ensuring adequate fish flows below Keenleyside In the
United States the Kootenay sturgeon listing is simply one example of how
listing of both resident and anadromous species under ESA has a significant
impact upon the operation of hydro facilities. In fact, some would ask, "Who
really runs the river? Is it the Endangered Species Act, or are Bonneville and
the Army Corps of Engineers?
Regional actors, I think, have also become increasingly significant within
the Basin. In Canada, perhaps the most important development was the crea-
tion in 1995 of the Columbia Basin Trust. The impetus for the Columbia
Basin Trust was the government of B.C.'s belated recognition that the resi-
dents of the region might have just been people in the way in 1964, but it was
time, with the impending return of the downstream benefits, to recognize that
the region has suffered serious impacts and that it was important to return
some of the treaty benefits to the region and to provide a vehicle for rein-
vestment in the region.34 In the United States, the key regional institutional
development was the creation of the Northwest Power and Conservation
Council in 1980. One of the responsibilities of the NWPPC was to establish
a program to protect and enhance the fisheries resources of the Columbia
River and to mitigate damage already done to anadromous fish. Funding for
the program comes from Bonneville's rate revenue.
Other actors include, of course, non-governmental environmental organi-
zations and tribal organizations. For example, one ENGO, the Sustainable
Fisheries Foundation 35 has been instrumental in convening a series of confer-
ences designed to focus on the Columbia Basin as a whole rather than par-
ticular national or regional jurisdictions within the Basin.36 Other ENGOs
have been instrumental in triggering the listing process for endangered fish
species under ESA while Canadian ENGOs have in some cases pressured the
34 See http://www.cbt.org/about/main.asp?fl=2&pg=history (last visited Sept. 30, 2004).
35 See http://www.sff.bc.ca (last visited Sept. 30, 2004).
36 See http://www.sff.bc.ca/Events.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2004).
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Department of Fisheries and Oceans to be more vigorous in using the federal
Fisheries Act to require BC Hydro to operate its hydro facilities in ways that
do not endanger fish and fish habitat. Finally, ENGOs on both sides of the
border have used the CEC process to pressure Canada to do a better job of
enforcing the Fisheries Act against BC Hydro.37 And while this submission
related to a number of BC Hydro's facilities one of the key facilities listed in
the petition as being an example of Canada's non-enforcement of the Fisher-
ies Act was the Keenleyside dam which the petitioners alleged was being
operated in such a way as to affect fisheries habitat under Section 35-1, and
that Canada was not enforcing the Act in relation to that facility.
38
CONCLUSIONS
Power and flood control values drove the negotiation of the CRT. Those
values remain dominant, but other values have been accommodated over the
course of the implementation of the Treaty. These other values have been
accommodated through the terms of the non-treaty storage agreements,
through annual operating plans agreed upon by the entities and through other
agreements such as annual fish flow agreements and the agreement that re-
solved the Libby dispute. The pressure to accommodate these values has
come from other actors relying principally on domestic laws rather than in-
ternational laws.
There are challenges that remain. Either party may terminate the Treaty
beginning in 2024 upon ten years prior notice. Interested parties such as the
Columbia Basin Trust are already starting to talk about what the options will
be in 2024. Another challenge is the continuing need to develop a basin con-
sciousness that crosses the 49th parallel. While the treaty itself envisaged the
coordinated development of the Basin other laws and institutions tend to fo-
cus our attention on different jurisdictional parts of the Basin. A visual dem-
onstration of this is the frontispiece of a briefing book prepared by the
Northwest Power and Conservation Council. While the NWPPC claims to
take an ecosystem approach to the Columbia basin the map on that front page
cuts the Basin off at the 49th parallel, and ignores the upper Canadian ba-
sin.3 9
37 See Registry of Submissions of Enforcement Matters, SEM-97-01, and Response from
Canada (July 21, 1997) available at:
http://www.cec.org/citizen/submissions/details/index.cfm?varlan=english&ID=46 (last visited
Sept. 30, 2004).
38 id.
39 See http://www.nwppc.org/library/2003/2003-2.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2004).
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